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Decoding Judgements: The AI Dilemma in Thaler v Comptroller-General

28 March 2025 | CaseSnappy Team

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The Collision of AI and Patent Law: An Introduction

In an era where artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping industries, intellectual property law faces unprecedented challenges. One of the most intriguing legal battles in recent years—Thaler v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [2023] UKSC 49—grappled with a fundamental question: can an AI be an inventor under UK patent law? The Supreme Court’s response was definitive, but the implications continue to stir debate.

DABUS and the Inventorship Question: Facts of the Case

Dr Stephen Thaler, an American AI researcher, filed two UK patent applications in 2018, crediting DABUS, an artificial intelligence system, as the sole inventor. Thaler himself claimed no personal inventorship but argued that, as the owner of DABUS, he should be entitled to the patents. The UK Intellectual Property Office rejected the applications, leading to a series of appeals that culminated in the Supreme Court.

Defining the ‘Inventor’: Key Legal Issues

Thaler’s case raised three pivotal legal questions:

1. Can an AI be an inventor under the Patents Act 1977?

2. Does ownership of an AI confer ownership of its inventions?

3. Should Thaler’s applications be withdrawn due to non-compliance with statutory requirements?

The Comptroller-General of Patents maintained that only a natural person could be an inventor under the 1977 Act, rendering Thaler’s claims legally unsound.

The Supreme Court’s Verdict: A Human-Centric View

The Supreme Court delivered a unanimous ruling against Thaler, reinforcing a traditionalist stance on patent law. Citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc v Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 43, the Court affirmed that an inventor must be a natural person. The ownership of an AI, no matter how autonomous, does not transfer inventorship rights.

Furthermore, as Thaler failed to fulfil the statutory requirements of section 13(2) of the Patents Act 1977, his applications were deemed withdrawn. Lord Kitchin, delivering the judgment, emphasised: "An inventor within the meaning of the 1977 Act must be a natural person, and DABUS is not a person at all, let alone a natural person: it is a machine …"

The Future of AI and Intellectual Property

This case marks a crucial precedent in UK intellectual property law, reinforcing human-centric interpretations of inventorship. Yet, as AI-driven creativity becomes more sophisticated, will legislation need to evolve? Could future laws grant AI some form of legal recognition?

For now, the Supreme Court has drawn a clear line: machines may create, but only humans can invent.

Stay tuned for the next instalment in our Decoding Judgements series, and sign up to CaseSnappy for free to summarize thousands of cases and concepts on-demand!

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